Impact on the Andean countries of the U.S.
economic slowdown
April 11,
2001
U.S.:
Economy
The United
States economy shows signs of a pronounced
slowdown since the third quarter of 2000, but
without any recorded decrease in activity that
could bear out the assumption that the country
is experiencing a recession (a negative
variation in the inter-annual GDP over two
consecutive quarters). The fact is that the
United States had 5% GDP growth in 2000,
topping the 4.4% and 4.2% figures of the
previous two years.
FIGURE No. 1
U.S.: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, DOMESTIC DEMAND,
AND IMPORTS
(INTER-ANNUAL REAL VARIATION RATE)

SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce
The slowdown
in U.S. GDP and the strong decline in indexes
of stock market trading (Figure No. 2) are
harbingers of a possible worsening of the
country’s negative economic growth, with
disastrous implications for the world economy.
As can be seen in the figure above, U.S.
imports took a nosedive in the fourth quarter
of last year.
FIGURE No. 2
INDEXES OF STOCK MARKET TRADING
 |
DOW JONES
The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA),
introduced by Charles H. Dow in 1896 and
encompassing the 30 most representative
shares of the important industrial
companies, is the oldest known
instrument for measuring stock prices.
|
 |
NASDAQ
The Nasdaq composite index includes
industrial, insurance, and banking
stock, each of which is weighted in
accordance with its market value. |
SOURCE: New
York Stock Market
This pessimistic
outlook for the U.S. economy is reflected in
the confidence of U.S. households in the
management of the country’s economy (it is
tied in with unemployment, inflation, and
effective income; bull stock market prices can
also play a part in consumer confidence),
which between September 2000 and February 2001
systematically plummeted 23%.
FIGURE No. 3
U.S.: CONSUMER CONFIDENCE COEFFICIENT

SOURCE: Conference Board
Starting last
month, however, this indicator began to show
signs of recovery. (Figure No. 3).
This behavior
can be explained as a response to government
efforts to avert a recession; three interest
rate reductions of one-half percentage point
each (two in January and one in March) and
current efforts to get Congress to reduce
taxes are the main measures taken to promote
domestic demand.
In any case,
slower U.S. economic growth will undoubtedly
have a two-fold impact on the region’s economy,
one via trade, and the other through finances.
Impact on
the Andean Countries
The impact on
trade will be directly proportionate to the
importance of the U.S. market for the exports
of the region’s countries, which may see the
demand for their products shrink heavily. The
fact is that the United States is the largest
export market for the Andean Community
countries, although its relative importance to
each of them varies widely. It is considerably
more important to Venezuela and Colombia,
almost half of whose exports it receives, than
to Bolivia, which with 23% of its exports
targeting that market, is the least dependent
upon it. It should be recalled here that the
United States at present absorbs fully one-fourth
of the exports of the developing countries. It
is interesting to note, however, that the lion’s
share of the exports of Ecuador, Colombia, and
Venezuela consist of oil, the demand for which
is less income-elastic; it is therefore to be
expected that this import will not be affected
to any significant degree by the slowdown of
the world’s largest economy.
TABLE No. 1
CAN - U.S. EXPORTS
(% OF TOTAL EXPORTS)

SOURCE: SICEXT, Andean Community
Even so, it is
essential in this context to secure the
renewal and broadening of the U.S. Andean
Tariff Preferences Act (ATPA), due to expire
in December of this year and under which the
United States benefits Bolivian, Colombian,
Ecuadorian, and Peruvian exports. Otherwise,
the situation could get very complicated for
the countries in the subregion; the problems
created by the decline in U.S. demand for
imported goods could be worsened by
difficulties in competing with the Caribbean
and African countries, whose products
currently enjoy larger margins of preference.
The reduction of
U.S. domestic interest rates, on the other
hand, would favor the Andean countries by
bringing down the interest they must pay on
their external debt.
It should be
stated that foreign debt service weighed
heavily on the subregion’s economies at the
close of 2000. For Bolivia, the external debt
represented 80% of its GDP, while the figure
was even larger in the case of Ecuador, at
94%, due to that country’s very large public
foreign debt. Assuming that 70% of its
external debt was incurred at variable rates
of interest, the subregion would save US$ 800
million a year for each percentage point that
interest rates are reduced.
TABLE No. 2
CAN: EXTERNAL DEBT
(YEAR 2000)

SOURCE: IMACRO
The reduction of
nominal interest rates in the U.S. would have
the further effect of decreasing the real
interest rate. This would incentivate a
renewal of the flow of private capital to the
emerging markets, for which private funds
constituted the main source of external
financing in the 1990s. When the net capital
flow to the region peaked in 1997 at US$ 83
billion, over 80% consisted of private funds;
by 2000, that percentage had dropped to less
than 67% and the total figure to US$ 67
billion (IMF, World Economic Outlook, Oct.
2000).
In the end, what
would be the net result for the region of a
U.S. recession? The findings of a recent study
conducted by the IDB (The Growth-Interest Rate
Cycle in the United States and its
Consequences for Emerging Markets, 2001) are
that in a typical U.S. recessive scenario
involving a 3.3% fall in GDP, with a reduction
of 1.5 percentage points in real interest
rates, Latin America would experience a 0.25%
drop in its GDP.
*The
statistics used in Economic Report come from
the Andean Community General Secretariat
Macroeconomic Information (IMACRO) system,
which is based on data obtained from the
official sources of the CAN Member Countries,
together with supplementary information
provided by international institutions like
the World Bank, the IDB, ECLAC, and the IMF.
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